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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
         Lindsey Coal Mine Company Liquidating Trust ("Lindsey") 
maintains that it is not subject to the Coal Industry Retiree 
Health Benefit Act of 1992 ("Coal Act"), and, alternatively, that 
the Coal Act, as applied to Lindsey, violates the Due Process and 
Takings Clauses of the United States Constitution.  It brought 
suit in the district court, in the nature of a declaratory 
judgment action, seeking judicial review of a final action of the 
Commissioner of Social Security and requesting summary judgment 
on its claims.  The district court denied Lindsey's motion for 
summary judgment and, instead, granted summary judgment for the 
defendants, the Commissioner of Social Security and the United 
Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund.  See Lindsey Coal 
Mining Co. Liquidating Trust v. Shalala, 901 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. 
Pa. 1995).  The district court held (1) that the Commissioner did 
not abuse her discretion in determining that Lindsey was covered 
by the Coal Act, and (2) that the Coal Act did not offend the Due 
Process or Takings Clauses.  Id.  We affirm. 
 
                       I.  BACKGROUND FACTS 
         The provisions of the Coal Act and the history leading 
up to its enactment are already well chronicled.  See, e.g.,  
Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114 (7th Cir. 1996), petition 
for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3741 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1996) (No. 95- 
1709), 64 U.S.L.W. 3742 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1751); In re 
Blue Diamond Coal Co., 79 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 1996); Barrick Gold 
Exploration, Inc. v. Hudson, 47 F.3d 832 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 64 (1995); In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 298 (1995); Coal Commission 
Report: A Report to the Secretary of Labor and the American 
People 16-19 (Nov. 1990).  We, therefore, will provide only a 
brief summary here. 
         Congress enacted the Coal Act, 26 U.S.C.A.  9701-9722 
(West Supp. 1995), to ensure that coal mine retirees and their 
dependents would continue to receive health and death benefits.  
Miners and their dependents had been receiving benefits under a 
series of agreements, stretching back to the 1940s, established 
by the coal industry and the miners' union.  Faced with 
shortfalls in the trusts that provided for these benefits, 
Congress acted to provide adequate funding.  It established, 
through the Coal Act, a comprehensive regime to provide benefits 
to retired coal workers and their dependents, funded through 
premiums allocated among present and former businesses in the 
coal industry.           
         The material facts in this case pertain to the history 
of Lindsey's structure and activities, especially over the last 
two decades.  Incorporated in Pennsylvania in 1910, Lindsey Coal 
Mining Company mined coal in Pennsylvania for forty-two years.  
Through its membership in the Central Pennsylvania Coal Producers 
Association (CPCPA), Lindsey became a signatory to the 1947 
National Bituminous Coal Workers Agreement (NBCWA), the 1950 
NBCWA, and the February 1, 1951, amendment to the 1950 NBCWA.  
These agreements were negotiated with the union that represented 
Lindsey's miners, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA).  
Lindsey contributed approximately $230,000.00 to the multi- 
employer benefit fund established by these NBCWAs.  In 1952,  
Lindsey ceased its active coal mining operations and began 
leasing its properties, for royalties, to various coal, gas, and 
logging operators as well selling real estate and scrap metal.   
         In 1974, the shareholders of Lindsey Coal Mining 
Company decided, in large part for tax reasons, that it was no 
longer "desirable" to maintain Lindsey in its corporate form.  In 
March 1975, noting that "time [was] of the essence," the 
shareholders of Lindsey entered into a trust agreement to "wind 
up the affairs" of the corporation as quickly as possible.  The 
trust agreement granted to a Liquidating Trustee full corporation 
powers in the former assets of Lindsey Coal Mining Company, 
including its real estate and mineral reserves.  See Lindsey 
Coal Mining Co. Liquidating Trust v. Shalala, 901 F. Supp. 959, 
964 (W.D. Pa. 1995). 
         It is now 1996, and Lindsey's liquidation has yet to be 
completed.  In fact, liquidation is not expected to be completed 
for at least another two to four years, when all mineral and 
timber resources will have been depleted or extracted.  
Meanwhile, during the past twenty years, Lindsey -- through the 
Liquidating Trust -- has negotiated the lease of land to a 
shopping center complex; leased land for coal, gas, and timber 
extraction; sold scrap metal; and paid approximately $20,000 per 
year in employee wages.  These activities generated significant 
income for Lindsey -- money that the Trust collects and 
distributes to the beneficiaries of the trust, the former 
shareholders of Lindsey Coal Mining Company.   
         In 1993, the Commissioner of Social Security assigned 
Lindsey liability for twenty-three of its former miners (or their 
dependents or beneficiaries) pursuant to the Coal Act, to be paid 
the first year at a monthly rate of $6,667.34.  Although 
Lindsey's disputes these obligations under the Coal Act, it has 
made timely payments to the Combined Fund to avoid the penalties 
for nonpayment.  See 26 U.S.C.A.  9707(b) (establishing penalty 
of $100 per day for nonpayment of premiums). 
 
                 II. APPLICATION OF THE COAL ACT 
           A. Lindsey's Contentions and Scope of Review 
         Lindsey's first contention is that it is not subject to 
the provisions of the Coal Act.  The Coal Act authorizes the 
Commissioner to assign premiums to any "signatory operator" (or 
"related party") that remains "in business."  26 U.S.C.A.  
9706(a).  Lindsey is exempt from the Coal Act, it argues, because 
it is neither a "signatory operator" nor "in business" within the 
meaning of the Act.  The Commissioner found otherwise.        
         Our review is deferential.  In reviewing the district 
court's order, we examine the agency's action under the same 
standard of review properly applied by the district court, seeFlorida 
Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985), 
granting favorable inferences from disputed facts to Lindsey 
since this is a summary judgment, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).  Although Lindsey 
sought review under the declaratory judgment act, see 28 U.S.C.A. 
 2201, the determination that plaintiff Lindsey is a "signatory 
coal operator" that remains "in business" -- and thus liable for 
Coal Act premiums -- was a final administrative decision made by 
the Commissioner of Social Security.  See 26 U.S.C.A.  9706(f).  
We review the Commissioner's decision as a final agency action 
brought under the Administrative Procedure Act.  See 5 U.S.C.A.  
704 ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency 
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are 
subject to judicial review.").  Thus, the question before us, as 
before the district court, is whether the administrative 
determination challenged by Lindsey satisfies the applicable 
standard of review set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act:  
whether the agency action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or not in accordance with law."  5 U.S.C.A.  
706(2)(A). 
 
                     B. "Signatory Operator" 
         We first take up Lindsey's contention that it is not 
covered by the Coal Act because it is not a "signatory operator." 
A "signatory operator" is a "person which is or was a signatory 
to a coal wage agreement."  26 U.S.C.A.  9701(c)(1).  It is 
undisputed that the Lindsey Coal Mining Corporation was a 
signatory to two coal wage agreements, one in 1947 and one in 
1950.  The only question, then, is whether the current Lindsey 
Liquidating Trust is the same "person" as the Lindsey Coal Mining 
Company that became a signatory to those agreements. 
         Lindsey contends that it is not a "signatory operator" 
that can lawfully be assigned premium liability under the statute 
because it is not the same entity as the Lindsey Coal Mining 
Company.  Because, in 1975, the Lindsey Coal Corporation became 
the Lindsey Liquidating Trust, the Lindsey Coal Mining Company 
has not existed for over twenty years, Lindsey argues.  The 
government responds, and the Commissioner and the district court 
held, that Lindsey Coal is a "signatory operator" because the 
current trust is essentially the same entity -- and thus the same 
"person" under the Coal Act -- as the Coal Mining Company.   
         We cannot say that the Commissioner abused her 
discretion in determining that Lindsey, in its current form as 
Lindsey Liquidating Trust, is the same "person" that was a 
signatory to the coal agreements.  The former shareholders of the 
corporation are now the beneficiaries of the trust, and the 
trust engages in the same activities -- primarily leasing its 
property for coal, gas, mineral, and lumber extraction -- that 
the corporation did for over twenty years before it changed form.  
And, as Lindsey appears to concede, its mere cessation of active 
mining activities in 1952 -- while it continued to operate as the 
Lindsey Coal Mining Company -- could not transform it into a 
different entity.  The Coal Act makes clear that a "person" can 
be liable for premiums even if it is no longer in the coal 
industry at all.  See 26 U.S.C.A.  9701(c)(7) ("[A] person shall 
be considered to be in business if such person conducts or 
derives revenue from any business activity, whether or not in the 
coal industry.") (emphasis added).  Thus, Lindsey is a "signatory 
operator" for purposes of the Coal Act.     
 
                        C.  "In Business" 
         Lindsey also contends that is not covered by the Coal 
Act because it is no longer "in business" under the statute. 
The Coal Act provides that a "signatory operator" is "in business 
if such person [1] conducts or [2] derives revenue from any 
business activity, whether or not in the coal industry."  29 
U.S.C.  9701(c)(7).  Lindsey concedes, as it must, that the 
trust derives substantial "revenues" from the former assets of 
Lindsey Coal Mining Company.  It maintains, however, that it is 
not "in business" because its activities are insufficient to rise 
to the level of "business activity." 
         We hold that the Commissioner did not abuse her 
discretion in determining that Lindsey remained "in business" for 
purposes of the Coal Act.  The Commission relied on a record 
which shows that Lindsey, as a "liquidating trust," has generated 
substantial income from leasing and sales ventures, the same 
activities it conducted for its last twenty-two years as a 
corporation.  Since beginning its "liquidation," Lindsey has (1) 
negotiated the lease of land to a shopping center complex; (2) 
entered into four coal leases permitting other companies to mine 
coal on trust property in exchange for royalties; (3) signed at 
least 13 agreements for the harvesting of timber on trust 
property; (4) derived royalties from six natural gas leases; (5) 
sold scrap metal; and (6) employed a part-time secretary at 
approximately $20,000 per year.  These activities generated 
almost $300,000 in income and capital gains for Lindsey in 1992 
alone.  This list of for-profit business endeavors could support 
a decision by the Commissioner that Lindsey was itself 
"conduct[ing]" business activity.     
         Lindsey's own "conduct" is not necessary, however, to 
sustain the Commissioner's determination that it is "in business" 
for purposes of the Coal Act.  The statutory definition of "in 
business" is broad, including within its scope not only (1) an 
entity that "conducts" business activity, but also (2) one who 
"derives revenue" from business activity.  See 26 U.S.C.A.  
9701(c)(7).  Because the "conducts" prong is provided for 
separately, the "derives revenue" prong does not require the 
party liable under the Coal Act to itself "conduct" a business 
activity.  Otherwise, the "derives revenue" option would be 
surplusage, which cannot have been Congress's intent.  By the 
statute's own terms, then, someone other than the "signatory 
operator" may be the one engaging in the business activity.   
         In Lindsey's case, the companies conducting the mining 
and harvesting operations pursuant to its leases with Lindsey are 
certainly engaging in "business activities."  And Lindsey cannot 
contest that it is "deriving revenue" from these business 
activities.  Thus, Lindsey is covered by the plain terms of the 
statute.   
         This interpretation is buttressed by the legislative 
history, which indicates that the statute was designed to cover 
just this sort of situation -- one entity deriving revenue from 
other entities' extraction of coal and other minerals from leased 
property.  See 138 Cong. Rec. S17635 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992).  
Indeed, without this definition of "in business," "signatory 
operators" could escape responsibility simply by divesting their 
actual mining operations and hiring outside contractors to 
extract the minerals.   
         Lindsey relies on two faulty premises for its argument 
that it is no longer "in business."  First, it cites to cases and 
other sources defining "carrying on a business" and "liquidating 
trust" under the Internal Revenue Code.  But definitions embodied 
in a different statute do not control as to whether Lindsey is an 
extant "signatory operator" for purposes of the Coal Act.  The 
Coal Act supplies its own definitions and serves a distinct 
purpose -- defraying benefit costs for retired miners, not 
defining the organization's income tax status.   
         Second, Lindsey claims that the Social Security 
Administration's internal guidelines demonstrate its status as a 
liquidating trust, exempt from the "in business" definition.  
This argument is also misplaced.  To begin with, the regulations 
that Lindsey cites are internal interpretative guidelines that 
lack the force of law.  See Matter of Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 930- 
31 (3d Cir. 1994).  Therefore, the agency is not bound to follow 
them and Lindsey is not entitled to rely on them.  Moreover, even 
on the guidelines' own terms, Lindsey cannot establish that it is 
not "in business."  Although the guidelines exempt liquidating 
trusts from the "in business" definition, Lindsey does not appear 
to qualify as a liquidating trust.  The most relevant instruction 
appears to state that an entity will lose its status as a 
liquidating trust if "the liquidation is unreasonably prolonged."  
Review Instructions, Section N.7.b.  The Lindsey Trust has been 
in the process of "liquidating" for over twenty years.  By its 
own testimony, this process will not be complete for several more 
years when its resources will finally be exhausted from 
harvesting and mining operations.  Thus, the Commissioner did not 
abuse her discretion in concluding that plaintiffs remained "in 
business" and liable for Coal Act premiums. 
 
                        III.  Due Process 
         We next consider Lindsey's argument that, even if it is 
covered by the Coal Act, the Act amounts to a due process 
violation in Lindsey's case.  The district court concluded that 
the Coal Act is rational economic legislation consistent with the 
substantive requirements of the Due Process Clause.  See Lindsey 
Coal Mining Co. Liquidating Trust v. Shalala, 901 F. Supp. 959, 
967-68 (W.D. Pa. 1995).  Noting the extremely deferential review 
accorded economic legislation, the court reasoned that it was 
rational for Congress to spread the costs of the Combined Fund's 
benefits to those employers who had profited from the labor of 
UMWA miners and who, at some time, had contributed to UMWA multi- 
employer benefit funds.  Id.     
         It is, of course, well settled that a statute adjusting 
the burdens and benefits of economic life is subject to minimal 
judicial scrutiny under the substantive aspect of the Due Process 
Clause.  See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 
(1976) (rejecting due process challenge to Black Lung Act, which 
required coal mine operator to provide compensation for former 
miner's death or disability arising out of work in mines even 
though former miner terminated his employment before Act was 
passed); Concrete Pipe and Products v. Construction Laborers 
Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (same for Multiemployer 
Pension Plan Amendments Act, which required employer to pay a 
share of plan's unfunded vested benefits when it withdrew).  A 
court must uphold such measures if there is any "conceivable" 
rational basis for the legislative scheme.  See FCC v. Beach 
Communications Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). 
         The reporters are full of court of appeals' decisions 
concluding, like the district court, that the Coal Act is 
rational economic legislation that comports with the substantive 
requirements of the Due Process Clause.  See Davon, Inc. v. 
Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114 (7th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 
64 U.S.L.W. 3741 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1996) (No. 95-1709), 64 U.S.L.W. 
3742 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1751); In re Blue Diamond Coal 
Co., 79 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 1996); Barrick Gold Exploration, Inc. 
v. Hudson, 47 F.3d 832 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 64 
(1995); In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 298 (1995).  We agree with the views expressed 
so well in these cases. 
         Notwithstanding the considerable array of authority 
opposing it, Lindsey argues that the Coal Act nonetheless 
violates substantive due process in its particular case.  
According to Lindsey, because it never actually promised 
benefits, Congress would act irrationally in holding it 
responsible for payments under the Coal Act.  Moreover, the 
district court identified no actions, Lindsey says, that could 
amount to implicit promises of lifetime benefits.   
         These arguments are wide of the mark.  Congress found 
that all employers who were signatories to wage coal agreements 
during the years in question created an expectation of lifetime 
benefits, and it determined that the fairest means to fund these 
liabilities was through premiums allocated among these operators.  
See 138 Cong. Rec. S17603 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (conference 
committee report).  Thus, the contention that Lindsey never 
explicitly promised lifetime benefits is irrelevant:  Congress 
found that the promise was implicit and, of course, Congress does 
not have to be correct in its beliefs -- just reasonable.     
         Lindsey's argument that the district court found no 
actions on Lindsey's part that could give rise to an expectation 
of benefits is similarly unavailing.  To begin with, it is 
incorrect.  As the district court explained, Lindsey was a 
signatory to the two wage coal agreements, actions which it found 
sufficient to constitute an implicit promise of lifetime 
benefits.  See Lindsey Coal, 901 F. Supp. at 963.  Moreover, 
Lindsey -- not the district court -- bears the burden of proof in 
its attempt to invalidate economic legislation on substantive due 
process grounds. 
         In addition to being incorrect on their own terms, 
Lindsey's arguments fundamentally misapprehend the substantive  
due process guarantee.  The essence of Lindsey's position seems 
to be that, while the Coal Act may contain generally rational 
classifications, the Act is irrational as applied to it.  In itscase, 
Lindsey contends, being a signatory to a wage agreement 
could not have amounted to even an implicit promise of lifetime 
benefits.  But this argument cannot sustain a substantive due 
process challenge.  Just because a measure is over- or under- 
inclusive will not render it irrational.  See Usery, 428 U.S. at 
19 ("[W]hether a broader cost-spreading scheme would have been 
wiser or more practical under the circumstances is not a question 
of constitutional dimension.").  A fifteen-year-old cannot 
successfully challenge a minimum age requirement of sixteen for 
driving on the basis that she would be a great driver even though 
most individuals of that age would not. 
          
         For the reasons set forth in the cases that have 
already canvassed this subject, see supra, we conclude that the 
Coal Act is a rational exercise of Congress's power to protect 
retiree benefits and to ensure that benefits disputes do not 
again disrupt interstate commerce.  The statute apportions the 
burdens of funding these benefits among coal operators who had 
employment relationship with miners, who were bound to national 
wage agreements establishing a retirement benefits program for 
those miners (and their beneficiaries), and who profited from the 
miners' reasonable expectation of receiving those benefits upon 
their retirement.  See 26 U.S.C.A.  9701.  While Lindsey has 
persuaded us that the Coal Act impacts it harshly, it has not 
carried its heavy burden of demonstrating that this legislative 
scheme is irrational. 
          
                           IV.  Takings 
         Finally, we evaluate Lindsey's contention that the Coal 
Act, when applied to it, effects an unconstitutional "taking" in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.  The district court held that 
the Coal Act does not violate the Takings Clause as applied to 
the plaintiffs.  See Lindsey Coal Mining Co. Liquidating Trust v. 
Shalala, 901 F. Supp. 959, 968-71 (W.D. Pa. 1995).  Applying the 
three-pronged inquiry mandated by Supreme Court "takings" 
precedent, see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104 (1978), the court reasoned that: (1) the character of the 
statute does not entail a physical invasion of property but 
assesses what is essentially a tax to continue a benefits 
program; (2) the economic impact on plaintiffs is sufficiently 
proportionate to the nature of its relationship with 
beneficiaries; and (3) especially given the heavily regulated 
nature of the coal industry (including a period of 
nationalization), any interference with plaintiffs' investment 
backed-expectations is not so severe as to outweigh other factors 
militating against finding a "taking."  See Lindsey Coal, F. 
Supp. at 968-71. 
         We agree.  As with the Due Process challenge, every 
court of appeals to consider a "takings" challenge to the Coal 
Act has rejected it.  See Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114 
(7th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3741 (U.S. 
Apr. 22, 1996) (No. 95-1709), 64 U.S.L.W. 3742 (U.S. Apr. 23, 
1996) (No. 95-1751); In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 79 F.3d 516 
(6th Cir. 1996); Barrick Gold Exploration, Inc. v. Hudson, 47 
F.3d 832 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 64 (1995); In re 
Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 
298 (1995).  We endorse the reasoning of these cases.  In 
addition, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a takings 
challenge to an analogous statute (the Multiemployer Pension Plan 
Amendments Act).  See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 
475 U.S. 211 (1986).  The Coal Act does not visit an 
unconstitutional taking on Lindsey.  
 
                         V.  CONCLUSION  
         We hold (1) that the Commissioner did not abuse her 
discretion in determining that Lindsey was covered by the Coal 
Act, and (2) that the Coal Act, as applied to Lindsey, does not 
offend the Due Process or Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.  
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
 
                                     
